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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jonathan Folk appeals from his judgment of conviction entered on a jury's
verdict finding him guilty of lewd conduct.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged Folk with lewd conduct by committing oral-to-genital
contact with five year old T.R. State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 331, 256 P.3d 735,
739 (2011). (See R. Vol. II, pp. 289-90.) The incident giving rise to the charge
occurred on Christmas Day, 2007, at T.R.'s home in Idaho Falls where TR. lived
with his mother and father, two younger siblings, and great-grandmother. (Tr., p.
177, L. 7 - p. 178, L. 18; p. 188, L. 1 - p. 189, L. 14; p. 413, L. 10 - p. 414, L.
12.) At the time, a family friend and her two young sons lived there as well. (Tr.,
p. 178, L. 19 - p. 179, L. 6.) Other family members, including a distant family
relative, were also visiting for Christmas. (R., p. 179, Ls. 17-22; p. 182, Ls. 1322.) Folk arrived that day to pick up the distant relative and drive to Boise after
dinner. (Tr., p. 185, L. 12 - p. 186, L. 20; p. 187, Ls. 18-23.)
Sometime before dinner, TR.'s mother went to his room and saw TR.
lying on his back on the bed with his legs "sprawled open" and feet on the
ground; Folk was kneeling down between TR.'s legs with his hands on TR.'s
hips. (Tr., p. 188, Ls. 13-25.) Before entering the bedroom, the mother heard
T.R. say, "Ooh, gross." (Tr., p. 189, Ls. 4-6.) She asked what they were doing,
and Folk responded, "We're just playing." (Tr., p. 189, Ls. 7-9.) T.R. said the
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same thing and was laughing. (Tr., p. 189, Ls. 9-12.) Folk was not laughing.
(Tr., p. 189, Ls. 13-14.)
Folk watched T.R. pick up toys for a few minutes, then left. (Tr., p. 191,
Ls.3-8.) When Folk was gone, the mother again asked T.R. what they had been
doing, and T.R. responded, "We were just playing, mommy." (Tr., p. 191, Ls. 915.) The mother testified that she left it at that, but had a feeling something bad
had happened. (Tr., p.191, L.16; p.192, Ls.19-24.)
When Folk was leaving after dinner, the mother saw Folk give change and
candy to T.R., but not to other children who were also in the room. (Tr., p. 194,
L. 24 - p. 195, L. 15.) The rest of the evening, T.R. was very "clingy" to his
mother, and shy to other family, which was unusual for T.R. (Tr., p. 196, Ls. 720.)
That night, T.R. woke his mother in the middle of the night saying he had
had a nightmare. (Tr., p. 197, Ls. 14-17.) T.R. said the nightmare was about
what "that bad guy did to him the night before." (Tr., p. 197, L. 24 - p. 198, L. 3.)
When asked "What bad guy?" T.R. responded, "Jon, Jonathan." (Tr., p. 198, Ls.
4-5.) At trial, T.R. testified that Folk molested him by sucking on his "private
area." (Tr., p. 336, Ls. 9-12; p. 337, Ls. 4-9; p. 338, Ls. 17-20.) Although Folkwho represented himself at trial - did not testify, he said in opening statements
that he was in T.R.'s room helping T.R. change out of wet socks, and playing.
(R., Vol. I, p. 40; Tr., p. 150, L. 19 - p. 151, L. 6.)
A jury found Folk guilty, but the conviction was vacated on appeal. Folk,
151 Idaho 327, 256 P.3d 735. On remand, the second jury found Folk guilty.
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(Tr., p. 666, Ls. 2-4; R., Vol. II, p. 380.) The district court sentenced Folk to a
fixed life term. (R., Vol. 11., pp. 399-400.) Folk timely appealed. (R., Vol. II, pp.
404-06.)
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ISSUES
Folk states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Were hearsay statements regarding a nightmare and what
allegedly happened the day prior to the nightmare
improperly admitted?

2.

Were prior convictions improperly admitted under IRE
404(b) when the only probative value of the convictions was
as propensity evidence?

3.

Does the doctrine of cumulative error require reversal?

(Appellant's brief, p. 9.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Folk failed to show the district court erred in admitting T.R.'s
statements about his nightmare?

2.

Has Folk failed to show the district court erred in admitting evidence of his
prior convictions under LR.E. 404(b)?

3.

Has Folk failed to establish cumulative error?
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ARGUMENT

L
Folk Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Admitting T.R.'s Statements
About His Nightmare
A.

Introduction
Before trial, Folk moved to exclude the mother's testimony about T.R.'s

statements describing his nightmare. (R., Vol. I, pp. 67-71.) The state argued
that the mother's testimony was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove
the truth of T.R.'s statements about his nightmare, but offered to show why
T.R.'s mother called police.

(See R., Vol. I, pp. 67-68; Vol. II, p. 290.)

Folk

asserted that the state's non-hearsay purpose for offering T.R.'s statements was
not relevant under LR.E. 401.

(R., Vol. I, pp. 69-70.)

In other words, Folk

argued that the mother's reason for calling the police was not a fact of
consequence to the determination of the action. See LR.E. 402.
As an initial matter, the district court recognized that, to be admissible,
evidence must be relevant, or have "any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence." (R., pp. 294-95 (emphasis
omitted)(citing LR.E. 401, 402), 297.) Although the district court found relevant
"[t]he fact that T.R. came to his mother's bedroom at 4:00 in the morning
complaining of a nightmare regarding Folk," it agreed with Folk that "T.R.'s exact
words" were not needed to show why the mother called police.

(R., p. 298.)

However, the district court then considered whether T.R.'s statements were
admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. (R., Vol. II,
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pp. 297-99.) Finding that the exception applied, the court denied Folk's motion
and allowed the mother's testimony. (R., Vol. II, pp. 297-01,305-06.)
On appeal, Folk asserts the district court's ruling is contrary to State v.
Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007).

(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-19.)

Because Field is distinguishable on its facts, and because the district court
correctly concluded the excited utterance exception applies, Folk's argument
fails.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a statement is admissible under the excited utterance exception

to the hearsay rule "is within the sound discretion of the trial court." Field, 144
Idaho at 567, 165 P.3d at 281. The trial court's decision admitting evidence is

kL.

reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

(citation omitted).

In determining

whether the district court abused its discretion, the appellate court considers if
the district court (1) understood the issue was discretionary; (2) acted within its
discretionary bounds and consistently with applicable law; and (3) reached its
decision through exercise of reason.
C.

kL. (citation

omitted).

Folk Has Not Shown The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Finding
The Excited Utterance Exception Applied
The district court appropriately determined that T.R.'s statements about

his nightmare were admissible under the excited utterance exception. For the
excited utterance exception to apply, two conditions must be met:
(1) an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render inoperative
the normal reflective thought process of an observer; and (2) the
statement of the declarant must have been a spontaneous reaction
to the occurrence or event and not the result of reflective thought.
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Field, 144 Idaho at 568, 165 P.3d at 282. In Field, seven-year-old H.P. told her
sister and mother that Field "touched her in her privatal [sic] area" and "put his
finger in [her] hole."

~

at 567-68, 165 P.3d at 281-82. H.P. did not make this

disclosure until two days after the alleged abuse.

~

Under the circumstances

of the case, the Court in Field concluded that two days was too long between the
startling event and the statement for the "spontaneous reaction" requirement to
be met.

~

In this case, the district court found the startling event was T.R.'s
nightmare, which Folk concedes satisfies the first requirement.

(Appellant's

brief, p. 13 ("a nightmare is a startling event"); R, Vol. II, p. 299.) As to the
second element, that the statement was a spontaneous reaction, the court found
that "very little" time passed between T.R.'s nightmare and his statement of what
the nightmare was about. (R, Vol. II, p. 299; Tr., p. 197, L. 14 - p. 198, L. 5.) In
addition, the court considered that T.R was only five years of age at the time,
thus tending "to negate maliciousness or intent to cause harm to Folk." (R, Vol.
II, p. 299.)

Unlike in Field, T.R.'s statements - that his nightmare was about

what "Jonathan" had done to him - were a spontaneous reaction to his
nightmare, not resulting from reflective thought.
P.3d at 282.

(See R, Vol. II, p. 299.)

Field, 144 Idaho at 568, 165

Thus, both elements for an excited

utterance were satisfied.
As already discussed, the district court found that T.R.'s middle-of-thenight complaint to his mother about a nightmare concerning Folk was relevant.
(R, p. 298.) This finding is appropriate because the evidence tended to make it
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more probable that something nightmare-inducing happened between Folk and
T.R., rather than the innocent playing that Folk suggested.

See I.R.E. 401.

Given the relevance of the mother's testimony, and that her testimony satisfied
the requirements for an excited utterance exception, the district court properly
deemed the evidence admissible. Folk has failed to demonstrate that the court
abused its discretion. See State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418,421, 224 P.3d 485,
488 (2009).
D.

Any Challenge To The Relevance Of T.R's Nightmare Is Not Preserved
For Appellate Review
Folk appears to challenge the relevance of T.R's nightmare and the

statements it caused. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14 ("T.R's statements about the
content of his dream are not probative of whether the events in the dream
actually happened.").)

Although Folk challenged the relevance of why T.R's

mother called police, he did not preserve a challenge to the relevance of T.R's
nightmare.

(See R, Vol. I, pp. 67-71.)

Where an "evidentiary challenge on

appeal is not the same as that presented in the motion in limine and no objection
during trial raised the specific basis, then that issue was not preserved for
appeal." State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 794, 932 P.2d 907, 917 (Ct. App. 1997)
(citations omitted).
To the extent Folk is attempting to challenge the relevance of T.R's
nightmare for the first time on appeal, he must establish fundamental error.
State v. Jackson, 151 Idaho 376, 256 P.3d 784 (Ct. App. 2011). Because Folk
neither asserts nor addresses fundamental error, the Court must reject any lateraised relevance argument about T.R's nightmare.
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E.

Any Error In The District Court's Ruling Was Harmless
Even if this Court were to find the district court erred in allowing testimony

regarding T.R's statements about his nightmare, such error was harmless. In
conducting a harmless error analysis, "[t]he inquiry is whether, beyond a
reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even
without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho
664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,
24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). The State has the
burden of demonstrating that an objected-to, non-constitutional error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961,
974 (2010).
Given the indirectness of the mother's testimony about T.R.'s statements
describing his nightmare, the weight of such testimony is necessarily limited.
More critical to the jury's determination whether Folk in fact abused T.R is
testimony by, and thus the credibility of, T.R

T.R's testimony at trial amply

supported the jury's guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Tr., pp. 33298.)
T.R, who was nine at the time of the second trial, testified that Folk
molested him by "suck[ing] on [his] private area." (Tr., p. 333, Ls. 1-2; p. 336, Ls.
10-12.) T.R testified that Folk kneeled down on the floor, pulled down T.R's
pants, and put his mouth on T.R's private area. (Tr., p. 336, L. 18 - p. 338, L.
24.)

During cross-examination, T.R. testified that Folk put his teeth on T.R's

private area and left a mark. (Tr., p. 348, Ls. 20-24.) Also, T.R testified that
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Folk pulled his pants down about to his knees.

(Tr., p. 352, Ls. 6-8.) When

asked if TR. previously testified that Folk just put his mouth on T.R.'s private,
T.R. said, "He did put his mouth there, but he didn't put his hand there." (Tr., p.
356, Ls. 18-24.)
Folk's cross-examination of TR. demonstrated that his memory had
waned, but also elicited testimony about statements made closer in time to the
abuse that included the following:
•

T.R. told police that Folk did not want TR.'s mom to know. (Tr.,
p. 346, Ls. 10-17.)

•

In the first trial, T R. testified that Folk tried to cover his mouth.
(Tr., p. 354, Ls. 7-10; p. 355, L. 21 - p. 356, Ls. 7.)

•

T.R. told a social worker / forensic interviewer that Folk said,
"Just let me rub it." (Tr., p. 366, Ls. 21-25; p. 503, Ls. 5-13.)

•

TR. told the social worker that Folk "went outside and puked
because [T.R.] peed in his mouth." (Tr., p. 369, Ls. 9-10.)

•

T.R. told the social worker that Folk put his ear to TR.'s private
area. (Tr., p. 370, Ls. 13-24.)

•

T.R. also told the social worker that Folk said "if [T.R.] told
anyone, [Folk] would come back and pretty much lie to them."
(Tr., p. 381, Ls. 2-8.)

•

T.R. told police that Folk "opened [TR.'s] pants up. [Folk]
bended [T.R.'s] pants, and he pulled them down. And then he,
then he put his mouth right there." (Tr., p. 387, L. 22 - p. 388,
L. 2.)

These statements enhance TR.'s testimony, under oath, by supporting the
consistency of his allegation that Folk touched him inappropriately, and by
showing Folk's efforts to conceal his crime from being discovered.
TR.'s testimony provided abundant evidence for the jury to find TR.
credible, and to find that Folk did inappropriately touch T.R. as charged. Thus,
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even without the mother's testimony about T.R's statements regarding his
nightmare, this Court can declare beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would
have returned the same verdict.

Any error in allowing the testimony was

therefore harmless.

II.
Folk Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Admitting Evidence Of His
Prior Convictions Under I.RE. 404(b)
A.

Introduction
Folk contends the district court improperly allowed evidence of his prior

convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault and criminal sex abuse.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 19-28; see State's Exs. 2, 4.) Specifically, Folk argues the
district court erred in finding the prior convictions were relevant for a permissible
purpose. (Appellant's brief, pp. 25-27.) Contrary to Folk's arguments, Idaho law
supports that the evidence was properly admitted.
B.

Standard Of Review
Rulings under I.RE. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard.

State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190, 254 P.3d 77, 91 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009)).

First, the

appellate court defers to the trial court's findings (supported by substantial
competent evidence) establishing prior bad acts as fact, but freely reviews
whether those acts are relevant to a material disputed issue other than
propensity.

~

Second, the court reviews for abuse of discretion the trial court's
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determination whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by unfair prejudice.
C.

kL

Folk's Prior Convictions Were Relevant To Folk's Motive, Intent, Or The
Absence Of Mistake
The State of Illinois convicted Folk of aggravated criminal sexual assault

in 1992 (involving victim M.P.), and criminal sex abuse in 1999 (involving victim
D.P.). (State's Exs. 2, 4.) Folk does not dispute these facts. (Appellant's brief,
p. 19.)

Before trial, the prosecution filed a notice of intent to use the prior

convictions as 404(b) evidence. (See R. Vol. I, pp. 169-70.)
The district court found that Folk raised the issues of motive, opportunity,
and intent, citing Folk's testimony in the first trial that he had been innocently
playing with T.R. in his room, helping T.R. change out of wet socks, and was
alone with T.R. for only 30 seconds. (R. Vol. I., pp. 174-77.) The district court
also determined that Folk's prior convictions for molesting M.P and D.P. were
relevant to show motive, opportunity, and intent, because they showed Folk's
ability and willingness to accomplish molestation "within a very short period of
time and in a discrete manner."

(R. Vol. I, pp. 179-80.) Concluding that the

probative value of the prior convictions was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, the district court admitted the evidence over Folk's
objection. (R., pp. 175-77, 179-82.)
On appeal, Folk asserts that his prior convictions were admitted solely to
show propensity, thus their admission was improper under I.R.E. 404(b).
(Appellant's brief, pp. 23-27.) Idaho cases support the district court's ruling.
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove the
character of the defendant in an attempt to show that he or she committed the
crime for which he or she stands trial. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188.
However, the fact that prior bad act evidence "tends to demonstrate the
defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior does not necessarily preclude
its admissibility." State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146,152,254 P.3d 47,53 (Ct. App.
2011).

Even if it demonstrates propensity, prior bad act evidence may be

admissible if relevant for a permissible purpose, including proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident. Gomez, 151 Idaho at 152, 254 P.3d at 53; I.R.E. 404(b). Gomez
illustrates the proper use of prior bad acts for purposes other than propensity.
In Gomez, a jury found the defendant guilty of lewd conduct with his
girlfriend's daughter.

kL.

at 150, 254 P.3d at 51.

On appeal, the Court

considered, among other issues, whether evidence that Gomez had sexually
abused the victim's sisters was relevant and admissible to prove opportunity and
credibility.

kL.

at 154, 254 P.3d at 55. The Gomez Court held that the prior bad

act evidence was properly admitted, given Gomez's opening statement and
arguments.

kL.

In his opening, Gomez highlighted "believability" as the "essential point" of
the case, and Gomez argued that he had no opportunity to commit the crime
given the circumstances (victim shared a bed with siblings when crime was
committed).

!fL

The Court held that, "whether Gomez had the opportunity to

13

engage in a lewd act with V.B. and whether her account could be believed were
squarely before the jury."

kL

Also, the evidence of prior misconduct

. . . was not entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate
Gomez's propensity to engage in lewd acts ... [but was relevant]
because it tended to show that Gomez seized the opportunity to
secretly touch V.B's breast and genital areas while she was
sleeping, since other individuals testified that he had exploited
other opportunities to engage in similar touching.

kL

at 155, 254 P.3d at 56 (citing State v. Cardell, 132 Idaho 217, 970 P.2d 10

(1998)).
As in Gomez, the circumstances here support that evidence of Folk's prior
convictions was relevant for purposes other than mere propensity. D.P.'s mother
testified that Folk reached into four year-old D.P.'s pants and touched the boy's
penis, despite being at a crowded laundromat with D.P.'s mother nearby. (Tr., p.
484, L. 21 - p. 486, L. 11; p. 490, L. 23 - p. 491, L. 4.) This testimony showed
that Folk seized the opportunity to molest D.P. in a very limited window of time,
with the potential for others to witness the abuse.

See Gomez, 151 Idaho at

155, 254 P.3d at 56. Similarly, Folk's abuse of T.R. occurred in T.R.'s bedroom
with the door wide open, within seconds of T.R.'s mother appearing in the
doorway. (Tr., p.177, L. 7-p.189, L.15; p. 247, Ls.12-16.)
M.P. testified that, when he was four, he was staying at a hotel with his
mother and father, and Folk offered to watch him at the hotel pool while M.P.'s
mother left to cook dinner.

(Tr., p. 429, L. 18 - p. 431, L. 21.)

While

"babysitting" M.P., Folk pulled the boy's swim trunks on and off, and bounced
M.P. on his lap. (Tr., p. 431, L. 22 - p. 432, L. 8.) On another occasion, Folk,
went under water in the hot tub and put his mouth on M.P.'s penis. (Tr., p. 433,
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L. 17 - p. 434, L. 4.) This testimony showed Folk creating an opportunity to
commit abuse under the guise of caring for the child-victim, similar to Folk
playing with T.R. and helping T.R. change out of wet socks. (Tr., p. 150, L. 19 p. 151, L. 4.)
Also, like the defendant in Gomez, Folk questioned the believability of
T.R.'s account. In his opening statement, Folk suggested he was simply playing
with T.R., innocently tickling his feet and belly. (Tr., p. 150, L. 19 - p. 151, L. 6.)
Folk stated, "[T.R.] took off his boots in the living room 'cause his mother asked
me to remove his snow boots. His socks were wet. We went [to his room] to get
him some fresh socks. And immediately upon entering the, the bedroom, the
mother asked us what we were doing." (Tr., p. 150, Ls. 20-25.)
In closing argument, Folk noted that T.R. told police, "[Folk] was just
playing, and he accidentally did it."

(Tr., p. 641, Ls. 4-12.)

Indeed, Folk

acknowledges on appeal that his "defense was that no [improper] contact
occurred." (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) Because Folk's prior convictions involving
D.P. and M.P. show Folk accomplishing molestation under the guise of innocent
childcare or in brief periods of time, they are relevant to show opportunity to and
motive in this case. Folk has failed to show the district court erred in finding the
evidence relevant.
D.

Folk Has Not Shown The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Weighing
The Probative Value Against Danger Of Unfair Prejudice
The second prong of the I.R.E. 404(b) analysis is equivalent to an I.R.E.

403 analysis.

Under Rule 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the

district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice-which is the tendency
15

to suggest a decision on an improper basis-substantially outweighs the
probative value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d
720, 722 (2010).

"The rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of

relevant evidence." State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007,
1013 n.3 (1990). But the weighing process is committed to the sound discretion
of the trial court. State v. Buzzard, 110 Idaho 800, 802, 718 P.2d 1238, 1240
(Ct. App. 1986).
Folk asserts that the district court abused its discretion because, under
Grist, the probative value of Folk's prior convictions "was entirely dependent
upon their tendency to demonstrate [Folk's] propensity to engage in such
behavior"; and, "[t]he only way the prior offenses in this case were probative of
opportunity was via the impermissible inference of 'if he did it once, he probably
did it again.'" (Appellant's brief, pp. 24-25.) As discussed herein, the probative
value of Folk's convictions was for more than mere evidence of propensity.
Folk's prior conviction involving D.P. showed that Folk was willing and able to
commit his crime despite a small window of time and with potential witnesses
around.

Folk's prior conviction involving M.P. showed that Folk created the

opportunity to commit his crime under the guise of childcare.

Because the

evidence was probative of opportunity, rather than for propensity alone, the
danger of unfair prejudice is diminished.
Folk thus fails to meet his burden of showing an abuse of discretion, and
this Court must affirm the district court's ruling under I.R.E. 404(b).
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E.

Any Error In Admitting The Evidence Was Harmless
Even if this Court finds that the district court erred in admitting the

evidence of Folk's prior convictions, such error was harmless. The standard of
review for harmless error, as set forth above, considers whether the jury would
have reached the same verdict, beyond a reasonable doubt, even without the
challenged evidence.
omitted).

Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669, 227 P.3d at 923 (citations

As discussed above, with respect to the testimony about T.R.'s

statements concerning his nightmare, the most powerful evidence against Folk
was testimony by the victim, T.R., elicited by both the state and by Folk. (See
supra.) In light of the ample evidence against Folk, through T.R.'s testimony, this

Court must conclude that the jury would have returned the same verdict, beyond
a reasonable doubt, even without the evidence of Folk's prior convictions.
III.
Folk Has Failed To Establish Cumulative Error
Folk's final argument is that the aggregation of errors show the absence of
a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, p. 28.) The accumulation of errors or irregularities
that deprives a defendant of a fair trial amounts to a due process violation. State
v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572-73, 165 P.3d 273, 286-87 (2007). However, Folk
has not established any errors or irregularities that have deprived him of a fair
trial. See Field, 144 Idaho at 572-73, 165 P.3d at 286-87. (Appellant's brief, p.
28.) Accordingly, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Folk's judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 15th day of October, 2013.
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